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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the effects of alternative factor weightings
on unitary apportionment. The results indicate that the payroll factor
tends to distort income allocations. Allocative fairness could be
enhanced by eliminating the payroll factor and using a sales-property
formula instead.

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF UNITARY APPORTIONMENT
INTRODUCTION
The out-of-state activities of a business cannot be taxed by a
state unless (a) there is some connection between its out-of-state
activities and the taxing state, and (b) there is a rational rela-
tionship between the income attributed to the state and the intrastate
values of the enterprise [ Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner , 445 U.S.
436, 437 (1980)].
To satisfy condition (a), a company must operate as a unitary
business [ Mobil , 445 U.S. 439 (1980)]. The legal test for this
requires that contributions to income by subsidiaries result from
functional integration, centralization of management, and economies
of scale [ Mobil , 445 U.S. 438] . The New Mexico Supreme Court has
ruled that "control over subsidiaries, the interdependence between
parent and aftiliates, the history or relationships, and the placing
of funds on a general account, all point to functional integration
and reflect the existence of an underlying unitary business" [ Taxation
and Revenue Dept. v. F. w. Woolworth Co. , 95 N.M. 519, 529, 624 P. 2d
28, 29 (1981)]. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that no single
factor is considered sufficient to establish the existence ot a
unitary business [ ASARCO Inc. , etc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission , 102
S. Ct. 3103 (1982); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept.
at the State of New Mexico , 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982) J
.
To satisfy condition (b), some cause and effect relationship must
be demonstrated. This condition, which affects allocative fairness,
is the focus of this study.
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JNHARY APPORTIONMENT
Forty-five states, out of the forty-six states which levy corporate
income taxes, have adopted the so-called three factor formula
[Hellerstein, 1983, p. 49 5 J . With this formula, unitary corporations
allocate business income among the states by averaging three propor-
tions: in-state sales to total sales, in-state property to total pro-
perty, and in-state payroll to total payroll. The underlying variables
are defined in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
[UDITPAJ. Business income, which is net income before federal taxes,
is generated in the ordinary course of operations. It includes income
from tangible and intangible property [UDITPA § l(a)J.
The three-factor formula can be denoted as follows:sew
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where
y. = income apportioned to state j,
Y = total business income
a. = 1/3 (i = 1,2,3)
s. = sales attributable to state j,
c = property attributable to state j,
w. = payroll attributable to state j,
or, equivalently
y, = YP . (lb)
P
j
= [a
I p lj + a 2 p 2j
+ a
3 p 3j J
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where
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p. = proportion of income attributable to state j,
p,
.
= proportion of sales attributable to state j,
P2- = proportion of property attributable to state j,
pj. = proportion of payroll attributable to state j.
The sales factor includes gross receipts from services, rentals,
royalties, and business operations [ UDITPA § 1(g) J. It encompasses
sales, less returns and allowances, plus all interest income, and
service and carrying charges incidental to such sales. The destination
rule for receipts from sales of tangible personal property has spread
rapidly and is now in use in forty of the forty-five states that
have a sales factor in their apportionment formula. Identification of
the destination of a sale is the state in which the property is delivered
or shipped to the purchaser, regardless of the f.o.b. point or other
conditions of sale [ UDITPA § 16(a)]
.
The property factor includes the average value of all real and
tangible personal property used in the regular course of the trade or
business. In general, properties consist of land, buildings, machinery,
inventory, and equipment. Property held as reserves or standby
facilities is includible; however, property held solely for investment
is not. Traditionally, this factor was restricted to property owned by
the taxpayer, but in recent years the rule nas been modified by most
states to include rented property used in the business. Rental property
generally is valued at eight times the net rental cost (defined as the
annual rental rate less rentals from subleases of the property). Most
states use original cost to value other tangible assets for apportionment
purposes [ UDITPA § 11 J . Beginning and ending values are averaged.
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The payroll factor is defined as wages, salaries, commissions and
any other form of remuneration paid to employees for personal services
[ UP IT?
A
§ 1(c)] . The compensation of an employee is attributed to a
particular state if the services are performed entirely within the
state. If the services are performed both within and without the state
payroll is attributable to the state where the operations are based.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The goal of unitary apportionment is to allocate taxable income
among the states in a manner reasonably consistent with how corporate
income is generated [ Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bond , 103 S. Ct.
2933 (1983)]. Unitary apportionment implies that allocative fairness,
condition (b), can be satisfied with a simple formula [NTA Proc. 1950,
p. 349]. The relationship between the three apportionment factors and
income can be viewed as one of implied causality whereby the factors
are each presumed to contribute to business income, the dependent
variable.
In this study we empirically analyze the allocative fairness of
the three-factor formula vis-a-vis a number of simpler alternatives.
3
No previous study has addressed this issue. It is shown that the
payroll factor tends to distort income allocations and that several
simpler models provide more accurate predictions. Separate accounting,
which has served as a legal benchmark., is used to measure allocative
4fairness. The Committee of the National Tax Association on the Allo-
cation of Income and the American Institute of Accountants concluded
that separate accounting is theoretically preferable to fractional
apportionment [NTA Proc. 1939, p. 195 J
.
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METHODOLOGY
Unitary apportionment is necessary because most large corporations
operate across state boundaries. Corporations which operate in just
one state do not have to allocate income for state tax purposes.
Ideally, there would be a one-to-one correspondence between taxable
profits by segment and taxable profits by state. That is,, for each
segment or line of business, only a single state would be involved.
This ideal, depicted in Figure 1, implies that separate accounting
would be preferred as long as each segment were treated as a separate
profit center. Separate accounting would also provide a benchmark, for
evaluating alternative attribution formulas on a pro forma basis.
However, when firms operate across jurisdictional boundaries, pro-
fitability by state becomes more difficult to measure and formula
apportionment becomes necessary to estimate taxable income by jurisdic-
tion. As Figure 2 implies, however, this jurisdictional shift does not
affect the underlying economics of the firm. A firm's profit function
is not affected by jurisdictional realignments.
By separating the economic and jurisdictional determinants of pro-
fit, it is possible to evaluate the three-factor formula at several
levels. As Figure 2 implies, it could be evaluated at the segment
level. However, since the same formula applies to all corporations, it
could also be evaluated at the corporate level (see Appendix). Indeed,
the same relationships must hold across company and jurisdictional
boundaries. Moreover, a segment would use the same formula as a com-
pany would if it were merged with another company. This consistency
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makes it possible to use corporate data for purposes of testing the
three-factor formula.
General Model
Equation (2) was operationalized in terms of a regression as
follows
:
Pv = biPii, + b9P9u + b T.P^ + e '. C3)
'l plk "2 y2k u3^3k Tc
where
p, = proportion of total income associated with firm k;
p lk
= proportion of total sales associated with firm k;
p~, = proportion of total property associated with firm k;
p., = proportion of total payroll associated with firm k;
b. = factor coefficients;
e, = error term.k
To evaluate different formulas, eleven profit attribution models
were tested within a holdout sample. These models were evaluated in
terras of their ability to predict the proportion of total income asso-
ciated with firm k. This estimation-validation approach provided a
pure test of the formula weights per se.
Evaluative Approach
Allocative fairness, condition (b), was evaluated in six phases.
First, ordinary least squares (OLS) and restricted least squares (RLS)
regressions were used to estimate the factor coefficients of the three
statutory factors. These regression weights were then compared to the
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current weights. Second, the OLS and RLS formulas were used to pre-
dict income proportions in a three-year holdout period. These income
predictions were compared with corresponding predictions based on the
original formula. Third, in order to evaluate the effects of excluding
a factor, two-factor models were estimated. Fourth, two-factor
regressions were used to predict income and errors were compared to
those of the original formula. Fifth, the predictive ability of two-
factor regressions was compared to the predictive ability of two-
factor models with equal weighting. Sixth, the comparative accuracy
of all eleven models was determined using rank-order statistics.
Error Metrics
All things being equal, an apportionment method with less error
would be considered fairer than an apportionment method with more
error. Alternative formulas were thus evaluated in terras of margins
of error. This is consistent with the approach used by the courts.
To evaluate allocative fairness, margins of error were computed
within a post-estimation holdout sample (1979-81). This out-of-sample
approach has been used by economists and others to validate a variety
of causal relationships.
Two metrics were used to assess allocative fairness. Mean abso-
lute relative error (MARE) and mean absolute error deflated by mean
earnings (MAE) were defined as follows:.
N 81
MARE = ~ E E
N k=l t=79
Pkt " Pfct
pkt
N 81
MAE = - Z Z
N k=l t=79
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pkt " Pkt
p
t
• where
k = Number of firms indexed by k;
p*
t
= Predicted income proportion for firm k in period t;
pVt. = Actual income proportion for firm k in period t;
-
-l
k
p t
= k Z Pkt'C
k=l
"
In effect, the first metric treats each firm as having equal
importance, while the second one treats each dollar of error as having
equal importance. The first can be viewed as operationalizing
fairness on a firm-by-firm basis, while the second can be viewed as
operationalizing fairness on a societal level.
DATA SAMPLE
Because corporate tax returns are generally kept confidential, we
could not use such data to analyze the current formula. We could,
however, use financial accounting data. This approach has been used
by Sheffrin and Fulcher [1983] to examine the worldwide unitary method
of state taxation.
Zimmerman [1983J has compared financial accounting data to tax
data. He found that statistical differences were not significant.
Computations of corporate tax rates based on COMPUSTAT financial data
were comparable to corporate tax rates based on IRS data. Magnitudes,
trends, and cross-sectional differences were analyzed empirically.
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He concluded that financial data appeared to yield unbiased estimates
of effective tax rates.
Sampled Firms
A sample of 102 COMPUSTAT companies was used to empirically estimate
the relationship between the statutory factors and income. Each firm
in the sample provided sales, property, payroll, and income data for
twelve consecutive years ending with 1981. In addition, another 78
firms were added to this sample to form a larger sample for validating
the models in terms of post-estimation performance.
The three-factor formula was originally designed for manufacturing
and mercantile businesses [NTA Proc. 1939, p. 195]. Different methods
of apportionment are applied in many but not all states to electric and
gas utilities, transportation and communication businesses (which are
often taxed on their gross receipts), and insurance companies (which
are typically taxed on the basis of their gross premiums, Hellerstein,
1983, pp. 632-685). For this reason, utilities, transportation,
communication, and financial companies were excluded from the sample.
Variables of Interest
Whenever data surrogates are used, care must be taken to ensure
that the surrogates do, in fact, represent reasonably well the under-
lying concepts and constructs of interest. Variables in this study
were therefore examined for representational faithfulness.
Although states have a variety of income definitions for state tax
purposes, there is broad conformity to the Federal income tax base
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(Hellerstein, 1983, p. 266). This tends to reduce differences among
states
.
In general, differences between state taxable income and Federal
taxable income involve the treatment of capital gains and net operating
losses. These differences, however, tend to move state taxable incomes
closer to accounting incomes than Federal tax incomes. Most states do
not allow preferential treatment for capital gains and do not allow net
operating loss carrybacks and carryforwards.
Accounting income before Federal income taxes was used in this
study because few states allow a deduction for Federal income taxes.
No adjustments were made to the accounting data for dividends received
because deductions for such dividends are not generally made by the
states.
A major difference between state taxable income and accounting
income involves depreciation. Most states allow accelerated depre-
ciation, but most corporations use straight-line depreciation. This
difference, however, along with other minor differences, is mitigated
by the fact that this study relies on cross-sectional data.
Differences that affect all firms in basically the same way tend to
cancel out. Consequently, financial accounting information can be used
in place of tax information to investigate the allocative fairness of
various profit attribution formulas.
The following COMPUSTAT variables were used to provide accounting
data:
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Sales - Item 12 (net sales)
Property - Item 3 (inventory) plus
- Item 7 (gross plant) plus 8 times
Item 47 (rental expense)
Payroll - Item -42 (labor and related expense)
Income - Item 13 (operating income before depreciation) minus
Item 14 (depreciation) minus
Item 15 (interest expense).
To compute the property factor, the beginning and ending values for
inventory and gross plant were averaged in conformance with UDITPA .
Rental property was valued at eight times the net rental expense.
Payroll included all forms of remuneration for personnel services.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results presented here indicate that the weights currently
assigned to the three statutory factors tend to inflate apportionment
errors
.
Phase 1: Three-Factor Regressions
Separate regressions were performed for each of the twelve years
comprising the estimation sample (1967-78). Each regression was based
on a common sample of 102 firms. RLS and OLS regressions were con-
ducted in parallel in order to evaluate the possibility of omitted
variables
.
Table 1 compares the computed regression weights to the current
one-third weights. It indicates that the current weights did not even
approximate the regression weights in either sign or magnitude. Only
the property factor was remotely close to having a one-third coefficient
The sales factor, by far, dominated the other two factors in terras
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of magnitude. As expected, the adjusted coefficients of determination,
—2
R
,
indicated that the equally-weighted formula did not fit the
estimation sample as well as the regression weights.
Figure 3 shows how the three-factor coefficients behaved over time.
While there are fluctuations from year to year, the relative position
of the factors remains intact. This pattern suggests that multi-
collinearity was not harmful. "It is well known that collinearity
need not harm forecasts, even if it has harmed structural estimation,
as long as it continues into the forecast period" [Belsley, 1984, p.
183] . Furthermore, multicollinearity is often not a problem when the
purpose of the regression analysis is to make predictions of new
observations within the range of observations [Neter and Wasserraan,
1976, p. 345J.
Tade 2 provides additional evidence concerning the means, standard
deviations, and correlations among the factors and income. The highest
collinearity is between sales and property.
Phase 2: Three-Factor Performance
The predictive ability of the equally-weighted model versus the
regression-weighted model was tested using COMPUSTAT data for years
1979-81. Predictions from these models were compared by computing
mean errors in the holdout sample, as shown in Table 4, the mean
absolute relative error resulting from the statutory formula is close
to 90.6 percent. This error is reduced to 64.6 percent when the
unequally-weighted regression model is used. When the mean absolute
error is deflated by mean earnings, the error produced by the statutory
formula is 51.3 percent as compared to 39.4 percent when the three-factor
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regression model was used (Table 5). Thus, the three-factor regression
model significantly reduces distortion of income allocation within an
individual firm and also within a given state.
Phase 3: Two-Factor Regressions
In order to evaluate the possibility that the value of one of the
coefficients might, in fact, be zero, two-factor regressions were also
performed. Table 3 shows that, on average, the payroll factor had a
negative weight regardless of whether sales or property was the other
factor. When the payroll factor was removed, the regression coefficients
for sales and property were essentially equal. This tends to confirm
that collinearity exists between these factors; that is, the sales and
property proportions appear to be essentially redundant. Table 2 shows
that the correlation coefficient between these factors was .9174.
Furthermore, tne correlation between sales and income was .8784 and the
correlation between property and income was .8841.
Phase 4: Two-Factor Performance
Margins of error for the two-factor models are presented in Tables
4 and 5. Relative to the current formula, only the sales-payroll
combination with equal weighting and the property-payroll combination
with equal weighting did worse in terms of MAREs and MAEs. The other
two-factor combinations outperformed the current three-factor formula.
When margins of error were measured in terms of MAREs , the
sales-payroll regression performed best among the two-factor models.
It produced a mean error that was 27.0 percent lower than the existing
formula. However, when errors were measured in terras of MAEs, the
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sales-property regression performed best. It reduced the margin of
error by 24.4 percent from the current formula.
These results suggest that the payroll factor should not have a
positive weight. This implies that the payroll factor might be the
prime contributor to inflated errors. In fact, both the two- and
three-factor models with positive payroll weights performed poorly.
Phase 5: One-Factor Performance
One-factor models were also evaluated for their predictive ability.
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that only the payroll model performed worse
than the current formula. The sales and the property factors each
performed better than the current formula, while the payroll weight
tended to inflate the margin of error.
Phase 6: Formula Rankings
In the final phase, the forecasting performance of all eleven
models was ranked in order to provide a different view of how much the
margins of error were affected by the weightings per se. Friedman rank
sums [Hollander and Wolfe, 1973, p. 138] indicated that there were
significant differences among the models in terms of mean ranks. For
each firm the best performing model was assigned a value of one, while
the worst was assigned a value of eleven. Intermediate values were
assigned in order. Table 6 shows that model (3), the sales-property
combination with equal weighting, outperformed the others in terras of
rankings. It is interesting, however, that the sales factor alone
provided reasonably accurate predictions of income.
7
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study suggest that less income distortion would
occur if the statutory factors were weighted differently. The RLS
weights appear to capture more accurately the underlying relationship
between the statutory factors and corporate income. This is reflected
in both model fit and predictive ability. However, these coefficients
also indicate that payroll is consistently negative when used with
sales and property. Thus, if labor were the dominant factor in a state,
the income apportioned to that state under the current formula would be
grossly overstated.
This finding also affects those states which apply the three-factor
formula to worldwide income. Since domestic wage rates are typically
higher than foreign wage rates, domestic income would be overstated even
more than it is now. This overstatement increases the potential for
double taxation. The results reported here therefore apply to the
related issue of double taxation which has generated much controversy
in recent years.
If the payroll factor were eliminated, a sales-property model would
perform well. The equally-weighted sales-property model was ranked
best overall in terms of predictive ability. This model would also
simplify, to some extent, state tax determination.
Footnotes
For purposes of this study, the UDITPA definitions are used.
These definitions have been adopted by twenty-three states and the
remaining twenty-two states wnich use three-factor apportionment have
adopted similar definitions which are essentially the same in concept.
2
See Granger [1969] and Newbold [1982] for an overview of
causality testing.
3
In 1964, a Special Subcommittee on State Taxation compared alter-
native formulas in terms of their effects on selected companies and
states. Its methodology, however, did not address the issue of alloca-
tive fairness per se. No attempt was ever made to empirically estimate
and evaluate the three-factor formula as such.
4
In Hans Rees ' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell [283
U.S. 123 (1931)], an apportionment method based entirely on tangible
property resulted in an attribution to North Carolina of approximately
76% of the taxpayer's income over several years compared to separate
accounting which resulted in an attribution of 21.7%. The Supreme
Court struck down the use of the one-factor formula because of this
large difference. In Container
, the percentage increase in taxable
income attributable to California by the three-factor apportionment
method as compared to the separate accounting method was only 14%. The
Supreme Court considered that figure acceptable [ Container , p. 2950]
.
Conceptually, the approach used here is similar in many respects
to the simulated-merger approach that has been used to assess the
effects of data aggregation on predictions of conglomerate earnings
[Silhan, 1982]. In this study, however, the focus is on the sub-entity
level as opposed to the total-entity level.
See, for example, Ashley, Granger, and Schmalensee [1980].
The factor coefficients in these models were set equal to one with
no intercept.
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FIGURE 1
Unitary Profits with One-to-One
Correspondence between Segments and States
(Separate Accounting)
State A
Segment 1
S egment 2
State B
y. = Profit attributed to Segment i and State s
FIGURE 2
Unitary Profits with Many-to-Many
Correspondence between Segments and States
(Apportionment)
State A
Segment 1
Segment 2
/ State B
A = Profit attributed to Segment i and State s
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Pearson Coefficients
Mean SD Sales Property Payroll
Sales .0098 .0166 —
Property .0098 .0170 .9174
Payroll .0098 .0160 .7439 .5683
Income .0098 .0220 .8784 .8841 .4541
0)
^H
a
1H
U-t
<4_l
0)
o
u
c
c
1-1
m CO
CO
U2 V
1 U
pa oc
< a
t-4 2^
Cfl
u
o
4J
o
fc.
I
o
H
c
s-i
>•,
CO
Oh
CN
CN
>>
4-1
•-
<U
O
u
I
BO
—
to
CO
CN
u
co
>*
^ «t rg N r^. oo \C —> m oc «? r*»
xccaaDaNxarsaxcc
rnmrsvO^o^cOHHiritN
I I I I I
ia n x o^ o> <f s i— r>- < cn ctiCXXO>(?CN\DvCNHO
OcMC^-HCNim^cic^inoOvO
x<^xa>a. o>irxrsxxx
o>vcmcoo-nvcmoc»Tr^mSr*n<Nino>Nr-unn H
I
^irii/ivc^ox^xxc^nM
I I I I I f I I I I I I
(^ vC IT O 00 —I vO iTl X •? S iTl
^mmvcvcooo^ttoociwtn
-<nnN(*ivON\o<, OMXHON^\ONXN<T'4 «frn
XO^XOCCCOOr^^OvOOCOOOC
iflOVHvfl-linvOMXACNX
in m n <r — m <r i—i ^^o vc nX < in in in in o^. p n n n »j
nf"-'voa(^Xina\inxx<JCxnx«jns-< <r r*» —
*
-^•-a'f^incG^mooomcor^
i—tm<r«C"«3"<TOOr-^v£)i— in
NXO>o-JMn<jn\DNX
vO *o vC s i—. i— r^r^r^r-»r»-r->»
CTv CTn CT> s CT^ G^ CTn O^ C3> C^ 0*> O**
x
00
CN
in
00
in
oo
u
o
u
a
to
vC
o i-i
SO >>
•
1
CO
a.
ii
m
r*. Si
o r*
o c n
vO •H u
t J-l o
^ CO 4-)
e o
•H CO
4-1 U-t
CD
r>» 1—
1
a >>
00 <D 4J
r-v > CO U
• a CD CU
iH u —
CO o
in 3 uO cr —
vC • CQ
r^» 11
vO j_i 4-1
in CO CO cn
• CO .a
u 0)
(J .—
'
. m
CO U
o -a o
1-( o 4-1
<r <4-l 4_> a
CN 1J CJ CO
m c •H <4-(
<r cC u
• •H 4-) CO
CO CO <u
cu .—
i
oo 4-1 (-1 «0
r^. O CO
1 G II
r* II
vO II CO
o> ~ rH
*~ a: s
o
3
CJ
-
03
U
CO
X)
O
u
[S3
;—
-
o
o
o
oO O
o
o
o
—
)
o
o o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
—
'
^^ •w' ^-^ v—s ^ ^ *-* ^ ^
30 o
o>
O
CO
30
I
—
i
cm
on
rn Osl
o
CO
m
m o X> x> CO r*. m x> «» c>
co
M
3
c
30
•H
CO
3
3JD
C
2
CJ
CO
<
—
CO
I
Ll
Ll
Ll
v
a2
-
o
s-l
-
5^
3
co
(^ r^> l^. 00 o in <r —
i
CM m
30
cm
1
CO
1
CO
•
—
I
1
1—
1
—
+
cm
1
+
O
CM
1
i
—
H
1 1 +
3
X>
CM i-H
ON
sO
H O—
I
m
CM
o
CO
o
m
CO
—
*
m
in
—
*
x>
m
+
CO in <r
<r <r f—i
o> x> CO CO
o
o
3
o
o
r^> ^"\ m
lO <r m
CM CO —
(
CO r». •
X) X) r^ r-»3 <r n ro
c?\ x> r>s r^
—
*
cn —J r-H 3 CM
X> o> o^ in in CO
v£> ON r*» r^. r>« :n
o
K
o
3
I
o
_
T3
3
CO
CO
22
CJ
OJ
4-1
3
—I
O
co
xi
<
3JDH
J
OJ
—
I
3
g
o
co
S-l
O
4_i
a
03
Eh
>>
i-i
O
4-1
3
4-1
03
4-1
CO
a Ed cd cxj c£
o
S-l I-I
3n ^
03 03
n
i
Q
1
—
1
— ^-h
>. 5s 5^ >. o
u 4-) 4-1 4-1 -H —J S-l S-l
U S-i u u r-J —J >, >,
0) CJ <D cy o 03 03
p Q. Q. Q, S-l S-l 2_i r\
o ^ >. 1 1
Ui M S-i U 03 03 >, >s >.
1 1 1 1
Q
1 T
4-1
S-l
4U
S-i
4-1
S-l
"~
j
Cfl cn •J3 CO CO CO 0) 3 CO 3 o
0) OJ 0) 0J OJ OJ o d. <D n S-l
—J _i w—> rH —
f
iH O H O 3^
03 03 03 03 03 03 S-l S-l 03 S-i 03
CO CO CO CO co CO Oi Qh CO 2-
O
cu
-H CN on <r m v£> r^» co o> "^ ^^
3
s
Li
O
<4-4
co
3
CO
u
CU
>
"3
0)
CO
03
XI
c
o
CO
co
CO
u
00
0)
Li
03
3
O"
3
Cd
°0|
•H
O
Li
a-
N
m
=-l
30
I
on
co
so
C
Li
03M
C
CO
<U
Jo
-2
a
a>
ij
CO
rH
u-(
cu
a
Li
O
U
Li
Cd
a)
o
CO
C
CO
(U
s
V
Ml
c
CO
j3
u
c
CO
cj
s
>
CO
a
s
50
c
•30
•H
0)
CO
Li
o
-J
a
'—
>.
O
u
CO
•u
cj-3
a
CO
co
OS
CN
r->.
CN
CO
o
CO on
m
o
n
in
•
CN
m
co
co
•
CO
o
in
•
CN
I
—
n
in
CN
•
CO
CN r^. ON on CO CN •<r ON <T r*.
co ^o v£> r». on O <r o CO —i
CN
1
CN
1
CN
1 +
rH
1
iH
+
CN
1
CN
1
CM
1 +
ON r-^ co CN ON CO in fx« o co
<—t CO CO ON on CO CN o CN oH H H o o o i-H H f-4 CO
<•"> /—
s
/-n /—N —
i
ON i—
(
«•>, r«"N ^N CO
ON o in <T r-s. r—
i
CM in n <f r*-.
r^ o m m rH o CN in ^^ CM CO
on o> o o • • • sO r^ r^. •
• • • • rH —
1
—
• • •
—
1
CO <r sO in m <r o 00 vO CO rH
rJ ON r-^ n* o iH ON CO O ON CO
m CO CO co ^o <r m CO <r CO CO
a ai Bd ai aj W
o
Li Li
>> >%
CO CO
1
CL
1
1—
1
iH
—
*
>, >> 5^ >* o
i-i u j_> l_l iH — Li Li
U Li Li Li iH i—
(
>% >%
CD CJ CJ CJ O CO CO
Q. >*v | Q Q. Li Li CL CL
O O >. >•> 1 1
Li Li Li L. CO CO >, >> ?^
T
CL
1
Oh
1
CL
1
CL
1 1
4-1
Li
i-i
Li
u 1—
(
1—
CO CO CO CO CO CO CJ QJ CO CJ o
0) 0) CD CJ CJ CJ 2^ r\ t CJ a. Li
r—
1
rH —
1
—4 r—
4
I— o —1 o >>
(0 CO CO c0 CO CO Li D CO Li CO
CO CO cn CO CO CO CL CL CO CL
o
CL
i—
fH CN CO <r in ^o r-. CO ON rH rH
"3
L
"Q
CJ
mh
CO
a
CJ
73
CJ
CO
CO
23
3
Li
O
<4-l
CO
3
Lt
>
i
Cu
C-J
-3
CJ
M
CO
d
o
•H
CO
co
co
Li
=0
cy
Li
rv\
CO
3
a*
CJ
Xi
3>
S-i r-^.
7>
u —i
u
M
—
1
eu X
u CJN
3 —i
—
*
CO
-C o
< X
0^
r*
—
Efl
GU
s
^
r«s
3>
1-j —
(
X
u I
u ^
w r^
3>
01 —
1
>
«H
-J
-—I
S! X
—
i
3>
<y iH
i;
u
4-1 O2 X
I—
1
er»
—
i
CO
X.
<
Tn
c r^
03 3>
:j —^
^-
i0
•r-l
4-1
r~
bb
'H
<u
CO
S-i
o
—J
a
co
5>N
s-i
o
—I
3
—
i
CO
4_l
x
in cm r^ m cm m •<T .c r--»O <r p*. C7\ O X o X 3> X: in c*^ O
o lO <r <r r~» m r>» in <r J^i X
<r lTi x en —• in 47N oo en _, _j f~S
o in O CM r^ r^ CTi r~^ O X —i <t O
o m in m X> in -O in in -n X
X r*. O c^ X O C7N ON X CN| 3 /">
o <r X CTv ON X O -sO X r^ m X o
x m <r <r x in r>^ m <r in X
o •
X —
H
m r-s x> CM r»« ON CN o X ^>>X r--. r«-N r^ -H ON r~. X rs < <r m o
m m <T <T r^ in -O in m j^ X o a
o •
CM >—
/
o —
i
X> X CO -<r m m <r m en
—
1
en X a> ^t vO o r^. o o in O ^n
o m «* <r r^ in r-^ in m in X —< o
r>. sO o X m CN in en _, c^ -T ^
o vO r—
|
CM X> X X r~. ^H r^ CTi CN O
•o m in m X> m o in in m i^. CTn O
X r-» O a> X O C^ en X CNI O •^
•w <r X ON <L^ X o o X r^. m X o
o m <r ^CT X in r^ m <r in X .0 o
o •
CM v_x
sO r^ lO m on —i rsj m m O CT\ ^vX r^. r»» X o CTN r^ c^ ^i m m r->- O
m m <r <r r^. in o in m m X en oX •
—
* ^/
a o£ Ed -y; Ed Cei Ed ai C£J Ul Ed
—i j-n
—
i
i—
1
o
i-i u
>, ^
CO 03
1
a.
i
—4 "
'
>% >. >% >> O o
4-1 4_) 4-1 4_J —
i
^H S-i S-i
S-i 1-1 S-i S-i r—
1
—4 >> >%
V 0) V ai o 03 cfl
a a a. Q S-i S-i o . a,
o o >, >, 1 i
t-i u u S-i 03 fl ^ 5^ >>
1 1
0h
1 1
Oi
1 1
4-1
S-i
4-1
S-i
4-1
S-I -H
CO 05 CO CO CO CO V cu CO 0) 3 X
0) 0) GU V 0) V a. a u r^ S-i
~4"
—
H
—
(
—t —1 —
1
o —
(
o >. c
CO CO CT3 CO CO fl S-i S-I 03 S_! CO crj ^~\X CO CO CO CO X a, 04 X n
o
iedin
rob.
—
1
."Nl en <r m o r*^ X CT> —
'
""
'
S-. Oi
<
I
Oh
M
-(| C
Xl
CJ
CO
CO
^3
CO
co
cu
S-i
50
0)
S-i
< n
1 < -^
3h CO
3
a*
CJ cy
APPENDIX
Statutory Factor Weightings
at Segment, State, and Company Levels
Segment to State
State to Company
Company to Companies
P-
-i
= a
iijk 1
pjk = ai + a
+ a.
w
I
Sw.
ijk
+ a.
Ew.ijk
JI
ijk
P,. = a -
JI
£Zs
ijk
KJI
EIZsijk
JI
ZZc
+ a
ilk I
21 KJI
ZEZc
!
+ a.
ijk
:
JI
£Ew
ijk
KJI
E££w.
.,ijk
Definitions
P ij!c
a
.
l
s
.ijk
w.
Ijk
P
Jlc
=
p..
proportion of unitary income attributable to segment i, state j,
and company k.
statutory weights currently set at 1/3 each.
sales attributable to segment i, state j, and company k.
property attributable to segment i, state j, and company k.
payroll attributable to segment i, state j, and company k.
proportion of unitary income attributable to state j and company k,
proportion of unitary income attributable to company k.



